A litany of failures by Rydon, the principal contractor on the Grenfell Tower refurbishment, means it bears “considerable responsibility” for the fatal 2017 blaze, according to the phase two inquiry report.
The report, released today (4 September), criticised numerous failings by the company, saying these had significantly contributed to the disaster that claimed 72 lives in June 2017.
It painted a picture of a main contractor providing little more than a superficial management service, outsourcing critical work to subcontractors and consultants without proper oversight or evaluation.
The report said: “The failure to put clear contract terms in place at the outset was likely to result in confusion if anything went wrong, but in this case it laid the gorund for what turned out to be a more serious problem.
“As principal contractor, Rydon saw its role as little more than the conductor of a large and varied orchestra.”
It added that the “overall quality of Rydon’s work fell significantly below the standard that could be expected of a reasonably competent design and build contractor”.
Management failures and reliance on subcontractors
Rydon was criticised for a failure to properly manage the complex web of subcontractors and consultants involved in the project. The report stated that Rydon “conceded that in substance it had provided the client, Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (TMO), with nothing more than a management service”.
The contractor merely acted as the main point of communication between the TMO and parties in the supply chain, the report said. “However, it is clear that Rydon failed in a number of important respects to perform even its management role properly,” it added.
Inadequate assessment of subcontractor competence
One of the most significant criticisms levied against Rydon was its failure to investigate the competence of the subcontractors it employed. Despite relying entirely on these subcontractors and consultants to fulfill its contractual obligations to the TMO, Rydon made “no serious effort to find out whether the bodies it proposed to engage… were competent”.
The report noted that Rydon did not recognize that Studio E, the architecture firm involved, lacked experience in overcladding high-rise buildings. If Rydon had been aware of Studio E’s inexperience, it might have taken the necessary steps to instruct a fire engineer to assess the safety of the external wall, potentially preventing the disaster.
Similarly, Rydon made no specific assessment of cladding subcontractor Harley, instead relying on its previous work with Harley on other projects, such as the Chalcots Estate and Ferrier Point projects.
Complacency over the project’s fire safety strategy
As the principal contractor, Rydon was responsible for ensuring that sufficient expertise and resources were available for the project and that the work carried out by external consultants, such as fire engineers Exova, was satisfactory. However, the report judged that Rydon’s approach to fire safety was “complacent”.
Rydon appeared to have “no interest” in the involvement of a fire engineer for the Grenfell Tower project. Despite attending a contractor induction meeting in April 2014, where Exova’s involvement was discussed, Rydon made no effort to understand Exova’s role or to engage with the firm meaningfully. In 2014, contracts manager Simon Lawrence, a key figure at Rydon, told Studio E associate Bruce Soanes that the company did not normally appoint fire engineering consultants, assuming that the safety of the design had already been established before Rydon’s involvement.
The report also said that Rydon failed on at least two occasions to respond appropriately to specific inquiries about fire safety from the TMO.
Failure to coordinate and monitor design work
Rydon’s failure to coordinate and monitor the design work effectively was another critical issue highlighted in the report. The absence of a clear matrix of responsibilities made it “extremely difficult, if not impossible” for Rydon to ensure that its subcontractors and consultants understood their separate responsibilities, the report said. This resulted in a failure of parties to recognise their responsibility for critical decisions affecting fire safety, including the compliance of the cladding with building regulations.
Rydon also failed to monitor the work of its subcontractors adequately, the report said. The company “appears to have assumed that Studio E was coordinating the design work” and authorised direct communication between Studio E and Harley without proper oversight.
In addition, Rydon did not make effective use of electronic drawing control systems, exacerbating the communication breakdowns and lack of coordination.
Inappropriate reliance on previous projects and building control
The report criticised Rydon for its undue reliance on previous projects and building control. “Insofar as Rydon turned its mind to the fire performance of the products used in the refurbishment at all, it assumed they were safe because it had used them on previous projects, particularly the Chalcots Estate and Ferrier Point projects, where it had worked with Harley to install ACM rainscreens,” the report said.
Rydon’s reliance on building control to mitigate its lack of expertise was considered “inappropriate and excessive” by the report. Rydon contracts manager Simon Lawrence gave evidence that he viewed building control as a “resource” on which he could rely because Rydon was paying a fee for it. The report said that it was “never appropriate for a principal contractor (or any other party) to rely on building control to ensure that its designs comply with the building regulations”.
Substandard site supervision and work quality
The report concludes by highlighting Rydon’s failures in site supervision and the general quality of its work. Although Rydon was responsible for inspecting Harley’s work, the inspections it carried out were deemed inadequate because “they failed to detect some serious defects in workmanship”.
Source: ConstructionNews